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THE NEW STATE di Mary Parker Follett | |
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Chapter V The Group Process: The Collective Will >From the group process arise social understanding and true sympathy. At the same moment appears the social will which is the creative will. Many writers are laying stress on the_possibilities_ of the collective will; what I wish to emphasize is the necessity of _creating_ the collective will. Many people talk as if the collective will were lying round loose to be caught up whenever we like, but the fact is we must go to our group and see that it is brought into existence. Moreover, we go to our group to learn the process. We sometimes
hear the advantages of collective planning spoken of as if an act
of Congress or Parliament could substitute collective for individual
planning! But it is only by doing the deed that we shall learn this
doctrine. We learn how to create the common will Until we learn this lesson war cannot stop, no constructive work
can be done. The very essence and substance of democracy is the creating
of the collective will. Without this activity the forms of democracy
are useless, and the aims of democracy are always unfulfilled. Without
this activity both political and industrial democracy must be a chaotic,
stagnating, self-stultifying assemblage. Many of the solutions offered
to-day for our social problems are vitiated by their mechanical nature,
by assuming that if society were given a new form, the socialistic
for instance, what we desire would follow. But this assumption is
not true. The deeper truth, perhaps the deepest, is that _the will
to will the common will_ is the core, the germinating centre of that
larger, still larger, ever larger life which we are coming to call
the true |
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Chapter VI We have seen that the common idea and the common will are born together
in the social process. One does not lead to the other, each is involved
in the other. But the collective thought and the collective will are
not yet complete, they are hardly an embryo. We see this in our daily life where we do not finish our thought, construct our will, and then begin our actualizing. Not only the actualizing goes on at the same time, but its reactions help us to shape our thought, to energize our will. We have to digest our social experience, but we have to have social experience before we can digest it. We must learn and build and learn again through the building, or we must build and learn and build again through the learning. We sit around the council table not blank pages but made up of all
our past experiences. Then we evolve a so-called common will, then
we take it into the concrete world to see if it will work. In so far
as it does work, it proves itself; in so far as it does not, it generates
the necessary idea to make it "common." Then again we test
and so on and so on. In our work always new and necessary modifications
arise which again in actualizing _themselves_, again modify themselves.
This is the process of the generation of the common will. First, it
appears as an ideal, secondly it works itself out in the material
sphere of life, thereby generating How important this principle is will appear later when we apply
these ideas to politics. Democratic ideals will never advance unless
we are given the opportunity of constantly embodying them in action,
which action will react on our ideals. Thought and will go out into
the concrete world in order to generate their own complete form. This
gives us both the principle and the method of democracy. A democratic
community is one in which the common will is being gradually created
by the civic activity of its citizens. Thus the unity of the social process becomes clear to us. We now gain a conception of "right," of purpose, of loyalty to that purpose, not as particularist ideas but as arising within the process. RIGHT We are evolving now a system of ethics which has three conceptions in regard to right, conscience and duty which are different from much of our former ethical teaching: (1) we do not follow right, we create right, (2) there is no private conscience, (3) my duty is never to "others" but to the whole. First, we do not follow right merely, we create right. It is often
thought vaguely that our ideals are all there, shining and splendid,
and we have only to apply them. But the truth is that we have to create
our ideals. No ideal is worth while which does not grow from our actual
life. Some people seem to keep their idealsall carefully packed away
from dust and air, but arranged alphabetically so that we can get
at them quickly in need. But we can never take out a past ideal for
a present need. The ideal which is to be used for our life must come
out from that very life. Moreover, the knowledge of what is due the whole is revealed within the life of the whole. This is above everything else what a progressive ethics must teach -- not faithfulness to duty merely, but faithfulness to the life which evolves duty. Indeed "following our duty" often means mental and moral atrophy. Man cannot live by tabus; that means stagnation. But as one tabu after another is disappearing, the call is upon us deliberately to build our own moral life. Our ethical sense will surely starve on predigested food. It is we by our acts who progressively construct the moral universe; to follow some preconceived body of law -- that is not for responsible moral beings. In so far as we obey old standards without interpenetrating them with the actual world, we are abdicating our creative power. Further, the group in its distributive aspect is bringing such new elements into the here and now that life is wholly changed, and the ethical commands therein involved are different, and therefore the task of the group is to discover the new formulation which these new elements demand. The moral law thus gathers to itself all the richness of science, of art, of all the fullness of our daily living. The group consciousness of right thus developed becomes our daily
imperative. No mandate from without has power over us. There are many
forms of the fallacy that the governing and the governed can be two
different bodies, and this one of conforming to standards which we
have not created must be recognized as such before we can have any
sound foundation for society. When the ought is not a mandate from
without, it is no longer a prohibition but a self-expression. As the
social consciousness develops, ought will be So in the education of our young people it is not enough to teach
them their "duty," somehow there must be created for them
to live in a world of high purpose to which their own psychic energies
will instinctively respond. The craving for self-expression, self-realization,
must see quite naturally for its field of operation Education, therefore is not chiefly to teach children a mass of
things which have been true up to the present moment; moreover it
is not to teach them to learn about life as fast as it is made, not
even to interpret life, but above and beyond everything, to create
life for themselves. Hence education should be largely the We must breed through the group process the kind of man who is not fossilized by habit, but whose eye is intent on the present situation, the present moment, present values, and can decide on the forms which will best express them in the actual world. To sum up this point: morality is never static; it advances as life
advances. You cannot hang your ideas up on pegs and take down no.
2 for certain emergencies and no. 4 for others. _The true test of
our morality is not the rigidity with which we adhere to standards,
but the loyalty we show to the life which constructs Secondly, I have said that the conception of right as a group product,
as coming from the ceaseless interplay of men, shows us that there
is no such thing as an individual conscience in the sense in which
the term is often used. As we are to obey no ideals dictated by others
or the past, it is equally important that we obey no ideal set up
by our unrelated self. To obey moral law is to obey social ideal.
The social ideal is born, grows and shapes itself through the associated
life. The individual cannot alone decide what is right or wrong. We
can have no true moral judgment except as we live our life with others.
It is said, "Every man is 1. This does not, however, put us with those biologists who make
conscience a "gregarious instinct" and -- would seem to
be willing to keep it there. This is the insidious herd fallacy which
crops up constantly in every kind of place. We may to-day partake
largely of the nature of the herd, our conscience may be to some extent
a herd conscience, but such is not the end of man for it is not the
true nature of man -- It is sometimes said, on the other hand, "The individual must
yield his right to judge for himself; let the majority judge."
But the individual is not for a moment to yield his right to judge
for himself; he can judge better for himself if he joins with others
in evolving a synthesized judgment. Our individual conscience is not 1. To a misunderstanding of this point are due some of the fallacies of the political pluralists (see ch. XXXII). Those of us who are not wholly in sympathy with the conscientious
objectors do not think that they should yield to the majority. What we want is a related conscience, a conscience that is intimately related to the conscience of other men and to all the spiritual environment of our time, to all the progressive forces of our age. The particularistic tendency has had its day in law, in politics, in international relations and as a guiding tendency in our daily lives. We have seen that a clearer conception to-day of the unity of the
social process shows us: first, that we are not merely to follow but
to create "right," secondly, that there is no private conscience,
and third, that my duty is never to "others" but to the
whole. We no longer make a distinction between selfishness and 1. See p. 45 (ch 4, para 4th) An act done for our own benefit may be social and one done for another
may not be. Some twenty or thirty years ago our "individual"
system of ethics began to be widely condemned and we have been hearing
a great deal of "social" ethics. But this so- called "social"
ethics has meant only my duty to "others." There PURPOSE As right appears with that interrelating, germinating activity which we call the social process, so purpose also is generated by the same process. The goal of evolution most obviously must evolve itself. How self-contradictory is the idea that evolution is the world-process and yet that some other power has made the goal for it to reach. The truth is that the same process which creates all else creates the very purpose. That purpose is involved in the process, not prior to process, has far wider reaching consequences than can be taken up here. The whole philosophy of cause and effect must be rewritten. If the infinite task is the evolution of the whole, if our finite tasks are wholes of varying degrees of scope and perfection, the notion of causality must have an entirely different place in our system of thought. The question is often asked, "What is the proposed unity of
European nations after the war to be for?" This question implies
that the alliance will be a mere method of accomplishing certain purposes,
whereas it is the union which is the important thing. Every teleological view will be given up when we see that purpose
is not "preexistent," but involved in the unifying act which
is the life process. It is man's part to create purpose and to actualize
it. From the point of view of man we are just in the dawn of self-consciousness,
and his purpose is dimly revealing itself to him. 1. This view of purpose is not necessarily antagonistic to the "interest"
school of sociology, but we may perhaps look forward to a new and
deeper analysis of self-interest. And the view here put forward is
not incompatible with the "objective" theory of association
(see ch. XXIX) nor with the teleological school of jurisprudence (see
ch. XV), it merely emphasizes another point of view -- a point of
view which tends to synthesize the "subjective" and "objective"
theories of law. But those jurists who say that a group is governed
by its purpose and leave the matter there are making a thing-in- itself
of the purpose; we are governed by the purpose, yes, but we are all
the time evolving the purpose. Modern jurists wish a dynamic theory
of law -- only such a conception of purpose as is revealed by group
psychology will give value to
As this true purpose evolves itself, loyalty springs into being.
Thus we see that we do not love the Beloved Community because it is lovable -- the same process which makes it lovable produces our love for it. Moreover it is not enough to love the Beloved Community, we must find out how to create it. It is not there for us to accept or reject -- it exists only through us. Loyalty to a collective will which we have not created and of which we are, therefore, not an integral part, is slavery. We belong to our community just in so far as we are helping to make that community; then loyalty follows, then love follows. Loyalty means the consciousness of oneness, the full realization that we succeed or fail, live or die, are saved or damned together. The only unity or community is one we have made of ourselves, by ourselves, for ourselves [1]. 1. In a relation of two I am not faithful to the other person but
to my conception of the relation in the whole. Thus the social process is one all-inclusive, Self-sufficing process.
The vital impulse which is produced by all the reciprocally interacting
influences of the group is also itself the generating and the vivifying
power. Social unity is not a sterile conception but an active force.
It is a double process -- the activity which goes to make the unity
and the activity which flows from the unity. There is no better example
of centripetal and |